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The monograph discusses the tactical organization of artillery at division level to mass its fires. Specifically, this study asks, given that mass fires remain desirable and may be feasible, what principles must govern the tactical organization of artillery at division level to mass? This monograph is a historical analysis of Soviet and American World War II experiences in the organization of artillery at division level to mass fires. Both country's artillery experiences, organization, methodology, and techniques are examined to isolate relevant sets of principles for organizing artillery tactically at division to mass. These principles are then contrasted to reveal similarities and differences to isolate a set of historically derived principles. Subsequently, these principles are compared to evolving battlefield changes since World War II, AirLand Battle doctrine and a vision of the future battlefield to determine what effect they have on the historical imperatives. Finally, the conclusions of this analysis are compared to current field artillery doctrine to determine the doctrinal implications of tactical organization of artillery at division level to mass fires. Among the conclusions drawn from this analysis to organize artillery at division to mass are: the necessity of maximum centralized control by division, specifically fire planning, first priority in calls-for-fire, and positioning authority; the retention of sufficient artillery in general support; and the necessity to weight the main effort decisively with the fires of the general support artillery. Finally, this study concludes that current doctrine for the organization of artillery at division is both adequate and sound.