Sum of Their Fears

In the past doctrinal differences between the services over how best to use airpower in joint campaigns have led to disagreements over airpower mission and target priorities. During World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, ground commanders demanded greater influence over airpower employment, while at the same time, the Air Force and the Navy disagreed over the most effective method for command and control of airpower throughout the theater. In all four cases, the joint force commander (JFC) set up a targeting board or an equivalent to address individual service concerns. This thesis follows the history of joint targeting boards since World War II to illustrate the foundations that have led to today's joint airpower targeting process. Having established the historical background, this thesis explores the current solutions for determining airpower mission and target priorities. Joint doctrine has institutionalized the concept of targeting boards and recommends that a JFC use a Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB) to eliminate service disagreements over target priorities. In response to joint doctrine, the theater commanders have developed two contrasting models on how the JTCB interacts in the campaign planning process. One model integrates the board into the air component staff while the second model places the JTCB at the theater commander level, separated from component planning. Using the principles of war as a framework for analysis, this thesis compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model to determine whether a targeting board is an effective tool for the JFC in future operations. In the end, this thesis finds a Joint Targeting Coordination Board integrated into the air component staff as the greatest potential for providing a future joint commander with an effective process for determining airpower mission priorities and selecting targets.