Reconstitution

This monograph discusses the importance of understanding methods and considerations in planning reconstitution operations at the tactical level. It proposes that reconstitution operations are based on planning and the availability of manpower. It also postulates that, at the division level, reconstitution is a leadership not a logistic decision. This monograph examines the methods of reconstituting and shows the importance of advance planning for reconstitution operations. The monograph first examines historical examples of tactical reconstitution, beginning with the 28th Infantry Division at Schmidt. Other historical examples include the British forces in North Africa, the German SSTK SS Totenkopfdivision on the Eastern Front, the Korean and Vietnamese experiences and the Israeli experience. For each case a review is made of the decision using the method of reconstituting combat power and possible considerations in the unit. The conclusion is a discussion of various considerations and methods concerning planning or executing reconstitution operations including the use of current U.S. Army doctrine. The author proposes that tactical units, division level and below, can only conduct reorganization and not regeneration operations. He also recommends that tactical units plan reconstitution as a part of the estimate process. Reconstitution at the division level and below should include reorganization options, as well as rotation of units to maintain an optimal level of combat effectiveness.