North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office

Only nine countries have possessed nuclear weapons in the roughly eighty years since the US first introduced the atomic bomb to the world. Since then, a dangerous game of "will they, won't they?" has been played between these nations. The most infamous standoff is the Cold War between the US and USSR, but the emergence of North Korea's nuclear program in the 1950s—with the support of the USSR—is often overlooked. While repeatedly downplayed in media over the decades, public consciousness is beginning to recognize North Korea's nuclear ability. In North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office, Frederick H. Fleitz, who has more than twenty-five years of experience working in US national security agencies, reveals the advanced state of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Fleitz examines the history of US policy toward North Korea from the Eisenhower administration to the end of the Biden administration and offers a history and an analysis of the development of nuclear infrastructure in North Korea despite US efforts to impede the development. He attributes this state of affairs, in part, to mistakes and inconsistencies in US policy from administrations of both political parties. Further, Fleitz covers the strategies employed by North Korea to delay, defuse, and otherwise work around various sanctions and agreements that both nations view as obstacles to their nuclear aims. Offering the work as a "resource for US officials, experts, media, and allies," Fleitz stresses the urgency of a coherent and effective US policy that recognizes both the seriousness of nuclear threats and the global, political, and military realities that have given rise to them.