Counterattack

This monograph seeks to determine whether the counterattack demands prioritization in the operational defense. It examines the operational defender's force allocation when he confronts a major enemy offensive thrust. The study includes a review of theoretical insights and three WWII case studies: the French in the Ardennes (1940), the Americans in the Bulge (1944), and the Germans in the Donetz (Winter, 1943). The analysis indicates the importance of battlefield shaping, the need to weigh force allocation decisions based upon operational design, the requirement to synchronize operational efforts to shape the penetration and to counterattack, and the necessity to translate holding a penetration into operational success. The monograph highlights key lessons for operational commanders. The study concludes that the operational commander should prioritize his allocation of forces to the counterattack. Further, in recognition of his limited available forces and the exigencies of a threat penetration, the operational commander must consider a scheme of maneuver for the defense that while disrupting the enemy, preserves the ability to concentrate for counterattack to win the battle.