Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind

This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in "e;epistemic bad faith"e; in light of what psychology tells us. After all, the research shows not merely that we are bad at detecting "e;ego-threatening"e; thoughts a la Freud. It also indicates that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts-e.g., reasons for our moral judgments of others (Haidt 2001), and even mundane reasons for buying one pair of stockings over another! (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) However, reflection on one's thoughts requires knowing what those thoughts are in the first place. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? The activity would just display naivety about psychology. Yet while respecting all the data, this book argues that, remarkably, we are sometimes infallible in our self-discerning judgments. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and there is no Cartesian ambition to provide a "e;foundation"e; for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible.